the United Sta,tes is to review annually the "health" of American society. The question is: Who twill be in charge of providing the data about the changing state of the society and haw will it be made available to Congress? Stated more broadly, the issue concerns the mechanisms available to the national legislature to update its knowledge. In seeking an answer to this question, one must take into account: (i) the inevitability that knowled& about society will be politically "colored"; and (ii) that the slant of and the access to knowledge is affected by the distribution of resources used in its production and processing.
Political Elements of Knowledge
The current debate among social x ientists concerning the "objectivity" of social scientific knowledge is not central to our discussion. Even if it were shown e a t the social sciences could be completely free of value judgments, this would not mean that they are so at the present time. More importantly, the question of how a society (or its decisionmaking ,bodies) "learns" does not concern a "pure" scientific exploration but, rather, knowledge as it is applied to actual social situations. Here pragmatic considerations take priority, and these include political considerations.
Since the $writings of Immanuel Kant, it has been clearly established that scientific knowledge is always incomplete and tentative. The gap that exists between what we are capable of learning and what we in fact know is unbreachable. And the knowledge awe do have must be continually revised. Hence, one can never rely on the information one receives as such, even when it is the best available; one must always add interpretations to attempt to close the gap between the knowledge available and that which a rational decision ,would require. Also, scientific knowledge tends to be contained within comparatively abstract and specialized disciplines; it thus provides a highly fragmented picture of reality. Decision-making, however, requires synthesized knowledge and an inter-disciplinary perspective. Thus, science per se provides only limited help for the decision-maker who must find connections among the facts of numerous disciplines, each incomplete in itself.
In short, the relationship lbetween the social sciences and a societal decisionmaker is not very different from that between the natural sciences and a medical practitioner: Even if either practitioner bad mastered all knowledge which the scientific discipline contains, etation which is then though new knowledge generalIy into societal decision-making ses in this manner, there are signt differences in the degree to new facts are interpreted and the t to which politically undigestible are screened out. In part, this is a matter of how "hard" the science is, concern with national security and inand hence, how demonstrable are its ternational military commitments. Othfindings. In part, this depends on the er inequities have evolved over the of the relationship among knowl-years without having been deliberately edge producers .and bet,ween knowledge planned or decided upon; the great disand the decision-makers. This crepancy between the rewurces and facilities for the production of knowledge available to the executive and to the Legislature, #which is of particular importance here, is a case in point.
US next.
pluralism-the production of knowledge at many centers and the available support for this production at many sources-has often been cited as an important condition for increasing the validity of one's knowledge. Invalid Enter Congresp theories are more likely to linger longer when one school of thought gains con-
The decline of legislatures in all trol of all major centers and sources. Western democracies has (been noted Similarly, when access to the decision-frequently by contemporary political makers is limited, fewer interpretations scientists. This is the result of the rapid (and facts) reach the decision-makers, increase in the volume of the execuwho are then less aware of the tentative tive's activities without a concurrent nature of the facts and theories which increase in the legislature's capacity to they have received and of the range of oversee them. Thus, to put it somewhat possible alternatives before them. dramatically, in 1955-6, 96 U.S. Senpluralism alone is not sufficient; there atom had to oversee a 66.2 billion dolalso must be a roughly equal distribu-lar enterprise, while in 19654, 100 tion of resources and access among the Senators must oversee a 107 billion of information that compete as dollar enterprise, as well as two addito who will be the supplier (or among tional states (3). A similarly striking the suppliers) of the decision-makers. example is provided by the knowledge If not, the contest may become similar explosion. The executive, by far the to tbe confrontation between a young largest knowledge consumer in the man from the Legal Aid Society and a United States, uses millions of dollars battery of corporation lawyers. If the worth of information to guide its vast, young lawyer's case is particularly good, intricate network of activities. If legishe may prevail; it is more likely that latures are to examine these operations, his brief will be less adequate than that their efficiency, and their rationale, they of his opponents. An imbalance of this will require manpower and resources nature becomes especially significant in far beyond their present supply. The societal decision-making where there are basis of the problem is not, as it is numerous "judges'' and where the actor sometimes said, that few members of capable of Presenting the most per-Congress have scientific degrees; it suasive briefs to the greatest number would be neither practical nor desirable of judges is more likely to gain an ad-for Congress to rely for the evaluation vantage (1)-[A recent study shows that of social programs and legislation on a when RAND made a major ltew find-member who, in his youth, gained a ing of significant interest to the U.S.
Ph.D., let us say, in sociology. Instead, Air Force, its Own Patron, it took 150 the staffs attached to congressional combriefings, repeated "pulling of strings," mittees are too small, insufficiently circumventing of the lines of command, trained, and do not have adequate faciland a great deal Of maneuvering before ities to conduct independent analyses the finding made its way into the de-of the facts presented to Congress. cision-making center (211. Such a strenLegislatures, at the present time, rely uous and he-consuming effort could primarily on three sources for their not be undertaken by a member of a information: the executive, partisans university department or a representa-{interest groups), and unaffiliated exrive of an unaffiliated research center. perts. Of these, the executive seems to At present, it is clear that resources provide by far the largest amounts of and access in the United States (and facts and interpretations. And for each many other nations) are far fro fact and interpretation thus supplied distributed. The inequities of t which Congress is capable of challengkibution reflect the priorities of ing, scores of others (some of which For instance, about half of the often provide the context for the one budget and about half of its R challenged) go by unchallenged. Morependiture are allotted to defense over, CongSss has only a limited caposes, mirroring the country's pr pacity to review the "inputted" data the executive presents in response to congressional queries. While some Congressmen have acquired a high degree of expertise and knowledge of the areas with which their committees deal (for example, several members of the Armed Services committee), most seem unable to keep pace with new developments and new knowledge. Similarly, while some staff members are experts, many others are lawyers by training and politicians by ambition; they have neither the time nor the facilities, especially computers, to keep abreast of new information.
Partisan groups are the second source of information. The information they supply to Congress is frequenqtly aimed at contesting executive assertions. At the same time, however, this information is highly selective and slanted. The competition among interest groups with a variety of perspectives rarely yields a holistic view of society. And the adversary system allows its participants to determine which issue to focus on, and ignores those parts of the population not rep resented by interest groups; also, in many areas, interest groups are "specialized" and there are no countervailing groups (4). Moreover, the process is not an automatic one; the synthesizing of a multiplicity of segmented and slanted reports into one encompassing and valid report is a far more demanding task than is often implied.
Representatives of universities, unaffiliated research centers, the. press, and civic groups provide a third source of information. However, many of these experts are not "unaffiliated" in the full sense and often have special interests or ideologies to present. More importantly, there may be legitimate disagreement among them over facts, and above all, interpretations. But Congress ,has only a limited capacity to judge between the contested views provided by these various sources. For example, at the recent hearings about "The Full Opportunity and Social ACcounting Act," I argued for a separate facility attached to Congress (like the Library of Congress) that would provide for impartial analyses of societal data. My colleague, Philip Hauser, who testified after me, argued that this was not necessary since data provided by the executive was objective, reliable, and dependable (5). In this situation, how could Chairman Fred R. Harris and his subcommittee members 'determine which proposition was valid? Ideally, Senator Harris could ask his staff to check a random set of data presented to congressional committees during the last year. But this would require at least a few men working for a few months, more than the total staff of the subcommittee, and more effort than was allowed for his review of this act. Hence, their judgment, as well as most others, was likely to be made on the basis of "informal" perusals of information already available, on intuition, and political considerations.
It should also be noted that unlike branches of the executive, Congress has few funds to "farm out" research. For example, when NASA sought to stress that its space pfogram had considerable economic "spin-offs," it could grant funds t o researchers to search for corroborative evidence. However, if, after the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences had received the report, press reports had indicated that NASA had overstated its case, the committee could not, even if it desired, "farm out" a sample for independent review by a research organization.
Adaptation
The net result is the partial "blinding" of Congress and, in my judgment, the increasing exclusion of the executive's work from democratic supervision. It may be argued that in an age of mass information the "rule" of the expert is inevitable, and that it is just as well that politicians are kept from interfering in administrative processes. Making Congress more effective, it may be said, is making the conservative forces of society more powerful. However, the basis of the problem is that intensive and encompassing societal action requires societal backing (or "consensus") if it is not to be alienating or prohibitively expensive. In the past, the national legislature was a major source of this consensus. Now, since legislatures are provided with insufficient information (while the scope of societal activities is. steadily augmenting), their capacity to act effectively is declining. Lack of consensus is a major bamer.
In France, where the legislature is even weaker than in most other Westem democracies, an adaptation has evolved: The government experts deal directly with the various interest groups, sharing information with them, learning what their needs and preferences are, and influencing them to back the 3 necessary societal action. The interaction of the experts and the representatives of interest groups generates a measure of extra-parliamentary consensus-formation. (This process is even more visible in the European Economic Community which, in effect, has no legislature, but does have an active bureaucracy.) But these are nondemocratic adaptations, which create an executive bias toward the interest groups and neglect other segments of the public.
Conclusion
If the capacity of the legislature to build consensus and oversee the executive is to lbe restored, a variety of new resources must be assigned to the legislature. Larger staffs are needed for congressmen and especially congressional committees; the additional staff members should have research training and should not *be assignable to functions other than those of a congressional research assistant. A major congressional research unit is needed in which information {other than books and documents), especially statistics, IBM decks, and computer tapes could be stored. A unit of this type would be able to provide a congressman or congressional committee with a detailed analysis and evaluation of data submitted to him from other sources. (To some extent, the Library of Congress provides services of this kind, but we suggest that what is needed is a much more extensive, computer-operated and wholly research-oriented unit). In addition, there should be sufficient funds for congressional committees to "farm out'' research tasks. Finally, the informal hearing procedure should be replaced ,with a more rigorous one, so that witnesses #will be more reluctant to give "stretched" interpretations, and more inclined to arm themselves with valid information.
